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CAUSATION
ROSCOE POUNDI
Delivered as the first Harry Shulman Lecture on Torts, an annual lecture
established in memory of the late Dean of the Yale Law School.
I cannot speak on this occasion without some emotion.
Harry Shulman was a student under me in the Harvard Law School for
four years, taking his degrees of Bachelor of Laws and Doctor of the Science
of Law with marked distinction. He was the sort of student whose work is the
delight of his teacher's heart. The chief reward of the teacher is in the achieve-
ments of his former pupils in their subsequent careers, to which, perhaps, he
may be pardoned for thinking he may have in some measure contributed. What
Shulman did as lawyer, and teacher, and administrator was all that his teacher
had looked forward to. It was fully up to his promise as a student. He grew
as a lawyer and law teacher as his teachers had expected of him. He was sure
to have done much more had not an unkind fate cut him off in the height of his
powers with the prospect of a long and increasingly fruitful career before him.
It is a source of pride to have been one of his teachers.
THE PROBLEM
Very likely, one who essays a systematic exposition of causation as an
element in legal liability is undertaking what has been described as unscrewing
the inscrutable. Dean Green said of causation that it did the work of Aladdin's
lamp.' Goodhart questioned the "validity of a legal concept which cannot be
defined in precise and accurate terms but which must be described by a series
of conflicting analogies." 2 The authoritative exposition of the law of torts just
put forth from this school says wisely: "Perhaps recent years have seen a little
headway made in dispelling the confusion and taking some of the work load off
of this weary concept . . . ." But professors of jurisprudence may rush in
where lawyers fear to tread.
What has made causation a vexed problem today is the difficulty of achiev-
ing a satisfactory balance between the social interest in the general security as
a basis of tort liability and the social interest in the individual life as the basis
tUniversity Professor Emeritus, formerly Dean of the Harvard Law School.
1. Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEXAS L. REv. 471-72
(1950).
2. GOODHART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAw 131 n.8 (1931).
3. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1109 (1956).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of limitations upon liability. In contrast to the days when men went about in
horse-drawn vehicles, reaped with a sickle or a cradle and threshed on a barn
floor with a flail, we now travel in streamlined trains, motor vehicles and air-
planes at what would have seemed to our grandfathers incredible speed; and
accidents from mechanisms out of control, and to some extent beyond ordinary
powers of control, are incident to our everyday life in all callings. In the less
mechanized society of the fore part of the last century, Bentham put security
as the main end to which the legal order should be directed. 4 But the general
security, important as it is, is by no means all. If the general security requires
pressure upon those in control of the mechanical instrumentalities of danger to
life and limb, the economic order calls for a measure of free individual activity,
if only to make possible the abundant production demanded for a crowded
world with highly specialized individual tasks. Hence liability cannot be ex-
tended to the doctrine of article 406 of the Soviet Civil Code or what I have
called the doctrine of the involuntary Good Samaritan.5 There must be a bal-
ance. But how is it to be reached?
It cannot be attained by an apparatus of exact rules, attaching definite de-
tailed consequences to definite detailed states of fact, as in the law of property.
A basis must be found in principles, in received authoritative starting points
for legal reasoning.
I had thought at one time of deducing a principle or principles of limitation
from the jural postulates of life in the society of today. Postulates from which
we deduce liability might be put thus:
First, men must be able to assume that others will commit no intentional
aggression upon them. Hence, one who intentionally does anything which on
its face is injurious to another must repair the resulting damage unless he can
justify his act under some social or public interest, or assert a privilege because
of a countervailing interest of his own which there is a social or public interest
in securing.
Second, men must be able to assume that others will act reasonably and
prudently, so as not by want of care to impose upon them an unreasonable
risk of injury. But what is the measure of the reasonable in this connection
and how shall we fix the ambit of the risk which creates liability?
Third, men must be able to assume that others who maintain things or em-
ploy agencies harmless in the sphere of their use but potentially harmful in
their normal action elsewhere, and having a natural tendency to cross the
boundaries of their proper use, will restrain them or keep them within their
proper bounds.
It should be noted that limitations are implicit in each postulate: possibility
of justification in the first, a reasonably fixed ambit of the created risk in the
second and control and boundaries of proper use in the third.
4. BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION tit. 1, c. 7 (new ed. 1931).
5. Cf. Lord Bramwell's story of the pickpocket who having heard the charity sermon
was so moved by the preacher's eloquence that he picked the pockets of everyone in reach
and put the contents in the plate.
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Theories of limitation of liability have taken the form of theories of causation.
Can we formulate a postulate behind limitation of liability under the three
postulates? Many seek to do this by principles of valuing under ethical ideas
of value. The doctrine of the last century sought to do it by making liability
depend upon an idea of fault-of moral blameworthiness. The law of the last
century sought to do it by exceptions to liability for fault "based upon public
policy." But public policy was here a limitation of application of the postulate
of liability by balance of an undefined social interest in economic activity of the
person sought to be held. Hence, I prefer to approach the problem in another
way.
William James tells us of the struggle to find the more inclusive order.7
Shall we say, as to juristic thinking, the more inclusive idea? Etymologically,
idea means picture-a mental picture. So jurists seek the more inclusive men-
tal picture of what they seek to do and how to do it. What, then, is the idea
from which to start in solving the problems of the science of law? Increasingly
I have come to think that the more inclusive idea-the picture which can tell
us most of what we have to do in the administration of justice and how we are
to do it-is the idea of civilization: the idea of raising human powers to their
highest development. The fashionable Neo-Kantian sociological and juristic
thinking of today takes the more inclusive idea to be justice. But what is the
idea of justice? The leading philosophical jurist of the time put it as the ideal
relation among men.8 We are to begin with a picture of that ideal relation. It
cannot be a picture of an abstract man in an abstract world. Must it not be
one of the ideal relation among men of this age in the concrete world in which
we find ourselves, a crowded world of men living in politically organized
societies in a time of highly mechanized activities of every sort on every hand,
as Milton put it, "with dangers compassed round," a world of men seeking to
realize their expectations both by individual exercise of their natural faculties
and by cooperative effort? The condition in which they are able to do this we
call civilization. Let us start, then, with that idea.
Fifty years ago, the dominant picture was drawn from the Darwinian
struggle for existence. We all want the earth and the fullness thereof. There
is but one earth and myriads of individuals are competing for it, or at least for
so much as they can get and hold of what Spencer termed the natural media
of existence. Today, professors of the physical sciences are prophesying a
world in which no such competition will exist. Professor Soddy of Oxford has
told us that science is so multiplying abundance that there is to be in no dis-
tant future all that anyone can want.9 But as this abundance multiplies, men's
wants and expectations may multiply correspondingly; and, in any event, if
nature is to be made to provide fruits inexhaustibly, there will be tasks of pick-
ing them and transporting them, and no two can use the same single item at
6. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. REv. 97, 99 (1908).
7. JAmEs, THE WILL To BELIEVE 195-206 (1911).
S. RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE (4th ed. 1950).
9. SODDY, THE IxT1PRETATION OF RADIUm 5-6 (4th ed. 1920).
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the same time. At any rate, pending the arrival of the professor's economic
Utopia, we shall continue to have tasks of ordering satisfaction of infinite
human wants and expectations out of a finite stock of the goods of existence.
The condition in which this ordering has developed and made for increasing
production and increasing use of what is produced we call civilization.
Civilization has two sides: the mastery of external or physical nature and
the mastery of internal or human nature. Mastery of external nature has been
carried so far and is being carried continually so much further in our genera-
tion as to realize the biblical prophecy of inheriting the earth. But this mastery
has been achieved only through mastery of internal nature which has made
possible devotion of individual activity and energy to increasingly specialized
cooperative production and the research, experimentation and study which have
given increased knowledge of the materials and forces of physical nature and
how to use and control them.
This mastery over internal nature is achieved and maintained through social
control, by the pressure upon each man by his fellow men to do his part in up-
holding civilized society and to deter him from antisocial conduct, that is,
conduct at variance with the postulates of the social order. The major agencies
of social control are religion, morals and law. In the modem world, law has
become the paramount agency of social control. Our main reliance in the so-
ciety of today is upon the force of politically organized society. We seek to
adjust relations and order conduct through the systematic and orderly appli-
cation of that force.
This long exordium has seemed worth while as the foundation of a philo-
sophical theory of one of the debated problems of that part of the law by which
we seek to uphold the general security-to give effect to the claim or want or
demand asserted in title of social life in civilized society and through the social
group, to be secure against those forms of action and courses of conduct which
threaten its existence, and particularly in the law of torts, that form which
threatens the general safety. Along with this we have to consider in the law
of torts, in the theory of legal liability, the social interest in the individual life
-the claim or want or demand involved in social life in civilized society that
each individual be able to live a human life therein according to the standards
of the society. Furthermore, the economic order depends upon the productive
activity of individuals as well as upon their safety. Hence, liability imposed
to secure safety of life and limb must be limited with respect to free individual
productive and socially useful activity. Accordingly, we must seek a balance of
the general security and the individual life and develop liability and limitation
of liability in a workable theory. This balance has been sought in theories of
causation.
THE GENERAL THEORY OF LIAILITY IN THE LAW OF TODAY
In the general theory of tort liability in the law of today, liability to repair
injury is imposed to secure against intentional aggression, to secure against
imposition of unreasonable risk upon others under the conditions of life in the
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time and place and to secure against the operation of agencies and instrumen-
talities of danger to others correlative to power to control them.
Intentional aggression is the threat to the general security in a simple agri-
cultural society. Thus, Roman law and the common law began with a series
of named torts. In Roman law there were: iniuria, intentional injury to the
physical person or to honor; furturn and rapina, wrongful appropriation of
property; and daninum iniuria datum, injury to corporeal property. In the
common law there were: assault and battery, false imprisonment, trespass
upon possession of land or of chattels, conversion of chattels, and later, de-
famation. These named torts set a pattern for types of injury which became
important. They raised little or no questions as to balancing of interests or
limitations of liability except in defamation, which was taken over by the com-
mon-law courts from the ecclesiastical courts and, later, the Star Chamber.
How completely these named torts shaped thinking about negligence at the
outset of legal consideration of that subject is illustrated by the seventeenth
century treatment of negligent wounding by discharge of a musket during
military drill as a battery in the well-known case of Weaver v. Ward,10 and
by the insistence on a procedural distinction between direct and indirect in-
jury-between trespass and case-in the books as late as the end of the nine-
teenth century. 1
Development of urban industrial society makes intentional aggression less
common and less significant, and the chief threat to the general security comes
to be in the way men do things-in their carrying on items of their daily
activities so as, without intentionally harming others, to subject them to an
unreasonable risk of injury from which harm results to some one. Here belong,
in Roman law, Aquilian culpa, culpable injury to person or property, in the
common law, negligence. As to these grounds of liability, a question of relation
of the injury complained of to the risk created becomes important, and the
need of limitation in view of the economic importance of free individual activity
and the social interest in the individual life of the person to be charged leads
to theories of causation.
In recent times, chiefly in the last third of the nineteenth century and in-
creasingly in the present century because of increased industrialization and
mechanization of everyday activities and everyday furniture, letting instrumen-
talities of danger get out of hand and do injury has become the most serious
threat to the general security, has brought about the most and most serious
injuries to life and limb and has required overhauling of liability in all systems
of law.
just as the development of the law of negligence was hampered by ideas
brought over from the law of intentional aggression, the law as to injuries
incurred has had a struggle to throw off ideas developed in the older law of
negligence. As development of the law of negligence required a more inclusive
10. Hob. 134, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1617).
11. And, indeed, in the present century, in BOHLEN, TORTS 1-93, 177-298 (1915).
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idea than was given by the analogy of trespass and led to the fault theory of
liability, which could include both the named torts and negligence, today we
have once more to seek a more inclusive idea which will include the named
torts, negligence and what is often called strict liability by analogy to certain
survivals from liability as a substitute for subjection to private vengeance in
the beginning of the legal order.
THE FAULT THEORY OF LIABILITY
At this point, an excursus is required with respect to the fault theory of
liability. Development of a significant law of negligence begins in the seven-
teenth century. That was the era of the law-of-nature school of jurists who
held that reason could furnish a complete apparatus of rules of law good for
all times and places and men. The Latin word jus was too inclusive, meaning
what was right, a right and law. So it is in the language of Continental Europe
today. One word has to serve for the three ideas. In English, we are a bit
better off. We have right-what is right-and law. But English juristic think-
ing was influenced from the Continent. What was right was law. Thus, what
reason pointed out as right was law because it was right. Rules of law were
applications of moral or ethical propositions of incontestable universal validity
-not mere practical adjustings of conflicting or overlapping claims and ex-
pectations adapted to the time and place, worked out and tested by experience.
There was a good side to this identification of the legal with the moral. The
attempt to make law and morals identical by laying down legal precepts to
cover the whole field of morals and to conform existing established legal pre-
cepts to the requirements of a reasoned system of morals made the modem
law. But in the eighteenth century the creative energy of the law-of-nature
doctrine was spent. Instead of using "what ought to be" to establish "what is,"
jurists came to consider "what is" an authoritative pronouncement on what
ought to be-the law they found in the books was declaratory of the law of
nature. Where the analytical jurist of the late nineteenth century, to use
Holmes' phrase, washed the starting points for legal reasoning in cynical acid,
the philosophical jurist of the eighteenth and fore part of the nineteenth century
sought and gave plausible reasons for them as he found them. Formulation of
principles, that is of authoritative starting points for legal reasoning, as univer-
sally valid moral propositions became the accepted method of the science of
law. In America we received the common law as expounded by Coke and
Blackstone and the science of law as expressed in terms of the law-of-nature
philosophy by Blackstone.
Both in the law of Continental Europe and in Anglo-American law the
principle of liability accepted in the nineteenth century speaks from the eight-
eenth century law of nature. It is a moral proposition found by reasoning. The
classical statement of the principle is article 1382 of the French Civil Code:
"Every act of one which causes damage to another obliges him through whose
fault it has happened to repair it." Thus there are two elements of liability:
fault and causation. Liability followed from culpable causation of damage.
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Under this theory of liability, fault was taken to be moral fault. It was an
ethical theory, appropriate to the era of the development of equity in Anglo-
American law, the time when under the leadership of Lord Mansfield the com-
mon-law courts took over from Chancery the idea of restitution to prevent
unjust enrichment and made the common counts a bill in equity at law. In
consequence fault liability became encumbered with limitations derived from
what has been called technical equity. One who sought the aid of a court of
equity had to come into equity with clean hands. He could not urge his claim
in the court if his conduct in the transaction or situation out of which his claim
arose was against equity and good conscience. In the same way, if he sought
restitution to prevent unjust enrichment, he could not recover if he was in pari
delicto with the defendant who extorted money from him. Accordingly, if he
was one of a number of persons acting each for himself who cast an unreason-
able risk of injury on another to his damage, and the latter sued one of them
and recovered a judgment which he had to pay, the whole loss fell upon him.
Contribution was an equitable remedy. There was no contribution among
wrongdoers. Likewise, if A was seriously injured through B's negligence, but
A contributed to the injury by his own negligence, his contributory negligence
was a complete bar. He himself was also a wrongdoer. In all this, the com-
mon-law courts were treating liability for negligence on the analogy of the old
named torts of intentional aggression. A tortfeasor was a wrongdoer. He was
sued ex delicto. In a moral system of rules of law proceeding from principles
of morals and developed as applied ethics, a wrongdoer had no place as a claim-
ant for relief. That one person was thus made to bear the whole loss although
more than one had been culpable was not considered. Law was a body of rules.
As an abstract moral proposition, a wrongdoer had no claim to be helped. The
moral legal system could thus be made to yield some unmoral concrete results.
The Roman law and the civil law derived from it developed a doctrine of
what we now call comparative negligence. The total loss was to be borne by
the negligent actors in the situation in proportion to their fault. This was also
the doctrine of admiralty which here, as in so many connections, followed the
Roman law. Comparative negligence is now superseding contributory negli-
gence by legislation throughout the common-law world. The injustice of cast-
ing on one person the whole burden of loss in the accidents which are everyday
incidents of life in the crowded, thoroughly mechanized world of today has
become obvious. Legislation has been rejecting the rule of no contribution
among tortfeasors. The idea of negligence as moral fault was given up in Con-
tinental Europe a generation ago, and limitations of liability to cases of in-
tentional aggression and negligence began to crumble in the last third of the
nineteenth century. In addition, new theories developed to cover intentional
aggression, negligence and so-called strict liability are being urged. Culpa
causation as a general principle has been pretty well given up. But causation
has hung on, partly because of long general acceptance of Bacon's maxim and
more justifiably because the balance of the general security and the individual
life requires some limitation of liability, and the rule requiring proximate causa-
tion of damage appeared to supply the need.
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TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY OF CAUSATION
What we have to consider, then, is the technical development of the doctrine
of proximate cause in the nineteenth century; what it is, and what we can find
or develop to replace it. -
As to what the doctrine is, Sir Percy Winfield says justly: "[A] ny student
who expects a scientific analysis of causation will be grievously disappointed.
Up to a certain point the common law does touch upon metaphysics. But no
test of remoteness of causation . . . would satisfy any metaphysician. On the
other hand, no test suggested by metaphysicians would be of any practical use
to lawyers."' 2 Nor have the lawyers been able to work out a test satisfactory
to themselves as the enormous bulk of controversial literature on the subject
abundantly illustrates.'
Causation appears first in the English cases in the seventeenth century 14 in
terms of the Aristotelian scholastic logic which distinguished causa causans and
causa causati-the causing cause and the cause of the effect. 15 To give a
present-day illustration, if A parks his car in the road in order to put on a tire,
and B drives another car on the wrong side of the road and runs into A's car
which is started up and injures A, A's negligent parking in the road was a
causa causati. B's negligent driving on the wrong side of the road was a causa
causans. Later we read that "he that does the first wrong shall answer for all
consequential damages."' 6 To the same effect is what was said in the celebrated
"squib case."'1 7 But there the one who first threw the lighted squib into the
market-house cast an unreasonable risk of injury on those inside, while those
who impulsively threw it off their stalls in self-defense, if the case was treated
on the analogy of intentional aggression, had a privilege of self-defense. Next
we hear of the "legal and natural consequences" of the wrongful act.'8 Here,
too, the court is thinking on the analogy of battery. The word "proximate"
comes in later in the phrase "natural and proximate consequence."' 9 By this
time, negligence was ceasing to be treated on the analogy of intentional aggres-
sion; but a theory of negligence was at most formative. Successive negligences
concurrently contributing to the result led to comparison of causa causans with
causa causati. Since under the legal procedure of that time defendants could
only be joined in the action when they had acted jointly, it became necessary
to think who was to be held in case of concurrent causation by independent
12. WINFIELD, ToRTs 64 (4th ed. 1948).
13. See the bibliography in 2 Hmii & JAxms, ToRTs 1109 n.4 (1956).
14. Earl of Shrewsbury's Case, 9 Coke 46b, 77 Eng. Rep. 798 (K.B. 1610).
15. The action was trespass vi et ar ris for disturbing the steward of certain manors
in the exercise of his office. Id. at 50b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 806.
16. Roswell v. Prior, 12 Mod. 635, 639, 88 Eng. Rep. 1570, 1573 (K.B. 1701). Here a
nuisance was created by a lessee and continued by his assignee. The assignor was held
liable in an action on the case.
17. Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. El. 892, 899, 96 Eng. Rep. 525, 528 (K.B. 1773).
18. Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East. 1, 3, 103 Eng. Rep. 244, 245 (K.B. 1806).
19. Ward v. Weeks, 7 Bing. 211, 212, 131. Eng. Rep. 81, 82 (CP. 1830).
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negligences. Greenleaf said that in case of injuries to the person the damages
recoverable must be confined to the natural results of the efficient cause.20
"Natural and proximate cause" seems to come from one of Bacon's maxims
joined to the phrase in Ward v. Weeks.21 Bacon's first maxim reads: "In jure
non remota causa, sed proxima spectatur." He expounds thus: "It were in-
finite for the law to judge the causes of causes, and their impulsions one of
another: therefore it contenteth itself with the immediate cause; and judgeth
of acts by that, without looking to any further degree." 22 Of the sixteen cases
discussed by Bacon in support of his maxim, none has to do with liability for
negligence. One has to do with fraud, and there he says "the rule faileth."
Another has to do with crime, and he tells us that "the rule holdeth not in
criminal acts."'23
Bacon's maxim was given currency by Broom's Legal Maxims. It is note-
worthy that in the first edition Broom put the two exceptions noted by Bacon
and as application of the maxim referred only to cases of insurance.2 4 Other
applications were added in successive editions until in the current edition there
has come to be a long discussion of the maxim's application to negligence. 25
So far as Professor Beale could find, 26 and I have tried in vain to find it earlier,
the maxim was first used in America in a case in Pennsylvania in 1863.27 It
was evidently taken from Broom's Maxims which had been reprinted in The
Law Library, a series of reprints of English law books published in Phila-
delphia from 1830 to 1860. The phrase "natural and proximate" came into
general use in the United States in the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
given currency by Cooley.28 The book in common use before Cooley spoke
only of the natural and usual consequences.
29
It will be noted that the maxim as applied to negligence first assumes the
search for one defendant unless there was joint action or conduct, second goes
on the analogy of the named torts of intentional aggression and so, third, does
not think of negligence as the imposing of an unreasonable risk on others and
thus a threat to the general security. Even on those assumptions the maxim
was quite misleading. Unless as a matter of convenience, to save the trouble
of search for the efficient cause in a complicated case, since Bacon had pointed
out that it would be "infinite to consider the causes of causes," no good reason
could be given for putting the whole burden of liability upon one chargeable
with the last in point of time. As had been said in a case often cited: "The
20. 2 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 268 (1st ed. 1846).
21. 7 Bing. 211, 212, 131 Eng. Rep. 81, 82 (C.P. 1830).
22. BACON, MAx1txs OF THE LAW 1 (1630); 7 SPEnDING, Wosxs oF FRANcIs BACON
327 (new ed. 1879).
23. 7 id. at 327-30.
24. BRoo~i, LEGAL MAxIMS 165-71 (1st ed. 1845).
25. Id. at 144-46 (10th ed. 1939).
26. Beale, The Proxinate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARv. L. REv. 633, 635 (1920).
27. Scott v. Hunter, 46 Pa. 192 (1863).
28. COOLEY, ToRTs 69-71 (1880).
29. ADDISON, ToRTs 6 (1st ed. 1870).
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reasonable inquiry... is not which is nearest in place or time, but whether
one is not the efficient producing cause, and the others but incidental." 30
In England two views came to be urged. One was the doctrine announced
in the leading English text on negligence. It was that in establishing liability
there were two questions to be put: "First, an inquiry whether the act causing
the injury was wrongful; that being established, then, what are the actual con-
tinuous consequences of the wrongful act? The liability is determined by look-
ing a post, not ab ante. The defendant's view of the possibilities of his act is
very material to determine whether his act is negligence or not; it is utterly
immaterial to limit liability when once liability has been established."
'3 1
A number of points in this statement are noteworthy. It goes on the theory
of liability in the French Civil Code. It suggests that there may be a question
of limitation of liability for negligence. And it challenges the assumed need of
confining liability to some one person in case there is not joint action.
Beven founded this proposition on an opinion by Blackburn, J., as he then
was, in 1870.32 His doctrine was followed in America by Street 33 and by
Bohlen.3"
On the other hand, Sir Frederick Pollock questioned the dicta in Smith v.
London & S.W. Ry. 35 and later developed his criticism of that case and criti-
cized Beven's doctrine which was based upon it.36 Pollock held there was only
one question in negligence cases, not two. As he put it, the accepted test of
liability for negligence in the first instance was also the proper measure of lia-
bility for the consequences of proved or admitted fault.
But as late as 1907 English courts were saying: "Causa proxima non rem ota
spectatur."37
In the United States, the subject of causation was first fully and critically
explored by Judge Jeremiah Smith in 1911-12. 3 8 His conclusion, not general-
ly accepted at first, has proved to be a contribution of the first importance. As
he stated it, the problem was: "What constitutes such a relation of cause and
effect (such a causal relation) between defendant's tort and plaintiff's damage
as is sufficient to maintain an action of tort?" He put his conclusion as a gen-
eral rule thus: "Defendant's tort must have been a substantial factor in pro-
ducing the damage complained of." Or, he says, putting it more fully: "To
constitute such causal relation between defendant's tort and plaintiff's damage
as will suffice to maintain an action of tort, the defendant's tort must have been
a substantial factor in producing the damage complained of."39
30. Shaw, C.J., in Marble v. Worcester, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 395, 409 (1855).
31. 1 BreVN, NEGLIGEN CE 89 n.2 (3d ed. 1908).
32. Smith v. London & S.W. Ry., L.R. 6 C.P. 14, 21-22 (1870).
33. SmRET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGa. LiABILiTY 91 (1906).
34. BoHLEN, ToRTs 8 n.15 (1926).
35. PoLLocK, TORTs 369-71 (1st ed. 1887).
36. Pollock, Liability for Consequences, 38 L.Q. Rav. 165 (1922).
37. Hadwell v. Righton, [1907] 2 K.B. 345, 348.
38. Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HAv. L. REV. 103, 223, 303 (1911-12).
39. Id. at 309-10.
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The next thoroughgoing study was made by Professor Beale. He argued
that, in order to hold a defendant liable for injury suffered, the force he set in
motion or situation he created "must (a) have remained active itself or created
another force until it directly caused the result; or (b) have created a new
active risk of being acted upon by the active force that created the result."4
This proposition was directed to a doctrine of what was called insulation of the
negligence of one by the supervening active creation of a new risk by another
which had the result of immediately causing the harm complained of. The
doctrine got its name from the cutting off or separation of conducting bodies
by non-conducting bodies so as to prevent transmission of electricity-a strained
analogy which has done ill service to the law.
Professor McLaughlin argued that "the man who 'starts something' should be
responsible for what he has started" and that the something is "an active force
continuously producing change."
41
Dean Leon Green, in an illuminating paper argued "that in any given case
the inquiry is not directed toward discovering the cause of the damage, but is
whether defendant's conduct was a cause of the damage." Hence "the con-
sideration of other cause factors is incidental and only material on two points:
first, whether the part played by any other cause factor is a hazard for which
defendant should be held; and, second, whether in the light of all the other
factors the defendant's conduct played an appreciable part in the result.
'42 If
it is a cause, it is not to be "insulated" by another's wrongdoing. If it creates
a risk, what is the ambit of that risk?
Green says that, under this approach, it is for the judge "to say whether the
risk encountered is one which the rule was designed to protect against. This
requires the broadest survey of policies. It restrains the'judge from shifting
this most important problem to a jury as has been done time and time again
under the farcical term 'proximate cause.'" He argues that it restricts the
jury to the province of fact finding but insists that the judge give the proper
respect due such high function by not invading the province himself. Again,
he argues the judicial function is required to operate scientifically by conscious-
ly fashioning the law in view of the numerous factors involved "instead of rest-
ing the fashioning of law on a game of chance with a single factor always the
'trump.' ,,43
This recognition that we are searching for the ambit of the risk created was
a real step forward. Today, as joinder of independent wrongdoers and contri-
bution among tortfeasors are possible, determination of the ambit of each of a
number of negligences relieves the law of much of the difficult balancing of in-
terests which gave pause when the whole loss had to fall upon one of the tort-
feasors or else upon the person injured.
40. Beale, supra note 26, at 658.
41. McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARv. L. Rxv. 149, 164 (1925). This is the
idea of the squib case, Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. Bl. 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B. 1773),
and the old cases arguing as to causa causati.
42. GREE , RATIOxALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 134 (1927).
43. Id. at 200.
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Professor, now Judge, Edgerton reviewing the much discussed case of Smith
v. London & S.W. Ry. considered the effect of "slight chance of harm."44
This, as will be seen later, ties in with the ambit of the risk. In Roman law,
the ambitus parietis was a space of one and one half feet around a house which
was required to be left vacant. So ambit came to mean bounds, limits or ex-
tent. So ambit of the risk means the limits or extent of the risk created by
conduct not had with due care. Judge Edgerton's argument for leaving the
ambit of the risk in doubtful cases to the jury deserves more consideration
than it has received. There is something to be said for this as a matter for
which the common sense of a jury could be useful.
Sir Percy Winfield stated, as the result of the English cases down to 1948:
"A consequence is not too remote if it is direct. (2) The meaning of 'direct' is
this: (i) Where physical consequences result from negligence, they are not
necessarily indirect because a reasonable man would not have foreseen them.
'Physical' seems to mean consequences likely to ensue in accordance with the
scientific laws known to govern the world, irrespective of whether a reason-
able man would have foreseen such consequences. (ii) Subject to (i) the
criterion of 'directness' is, 'Would a reasonable man have foreseen the conse-
quences?' "45
It will be seen that there remains only the ghost of Bacon's maxim in calling
a test of directness a test of remoteness. Also, Beven's twofold exposition of
liability as depending on whether the defendant's conduct was wrongful and
whether the injury was a continuous consequence of that conduct, founded on
Blackburn's exposition in Smith v. London & S.W. Ry., is given up, and Pol-
lock's view that there is but one question is adopted.
Some American courts have worked out what is called the "but for" rule:
"The defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event if the event would have
occurred without it."46 This was considered by Judge Smith and Professor
McLaughlin in their papers referred to above.47 It will not explain the cases
of concurrent negligence to be dealt with later.
In 1920 the Supreme Court of Minnesota took as a criterion the test sug-
gested by Judge Jeremiah Smith in 1911: the defendant's conduct is a cause
of the event if it was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing it
about.48 This was developed in the American Law Institute's Restatement of
the Law of Torts.49 Part of the comment on this statement is worth quoting:
"The word 'substantial' is used to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct
has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard
it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense in which there always lurks
44. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 211, 343 (1924).
45. WINFILU, TORTS 71-72 (4th ed. 1948).
46. See PROSSER, TopTs 220-21 (2d ed. 1.955).
47. See notes 38, 41 supra.
48. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45
(1920).
49. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 431 (1934).
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the idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-called 'philosophic' sense which
includes every one of the great number of events without which any happen-
ing would not have occurred. Each of these events is a cause in the so-called
'philosophic' sense, yet the effect of many of them is so insignificant that no
ordinary mind would think of them as causes." What this comes to is that the
events may not in themselves have been serious threats to the general security.
This is the real point when we think of negligence as imposition of a risk which
is a threat to the general security and the ambit of the risk as determined by
the extent and seriousness of the threat. Bacon's difficulty in that the causes
of causes and their impulsions one of another are infinite disappears when we
get away from the analogy of torts of aggression and think in terms of what
William James would call the more inclusive order of threats to the general
security.
All that has been said as to causation as a ground of liability, following the
idea formulated in the French Civil Code, must be reconsidered today in the
light of the present-day concept of negligence as the casting or imposing of an
unreasonable risk of injury upon others and in that way threatening the general
security.
This is what the Restatement of the Law of Torts was feeling for in the
definition in section 282: "In the Restatement of this subject, negligence is any
conduct, except conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others [which
is taken to amount to aggression], which falls below the standard established
by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm." The
doctrinal writers of the civil law have been coming to the same result. 0
The problem of causation, then, is one of ascertaining the ambit of the risk
created by the defendant as determined by the gravity of the threat to the
general security.
But if, as has often been said, foreseeability is hard to define with respect
to particular cases, it may be asked if we are better off in asking about the
ambit of the risk created, as fixed by the gravity of the threat to the general
security. Application of such standards as reasonableness, foreseeability, gravity
of the threat is never easy in marginal cases., but we can't give it up in defer-
ence to Mr. Dooley's judge who could not think outside of a hammock. One
of these standards is no easier of application than another, and the merit of the
test of gravity or seriousness of the threat to the general security is that it
relates the quest immediately to the purpose of the law. I submit that the test
of the ambit of the risk is the degree of threat to the general security, under
the conditions of today, in what the defendant did or how he was doing it.
This is brought out in two recent cases: the Polemis case in England and
the Palsgraf case in New York. These two cases have been much discussed
50. 2 PLANIOL & Rn'ERT, TpIuuT LENTARE DE DROIT CIVIL Nos. 863, 869 (11th
ed. 1931); ENDEMANN, LEHRBUCH DEs BORGERLICHEN REcHTs § 129 (9th ed. 1903);
Ri 0EN, M., VERIVENDUNG DER CAUSALBEGRIFFE IN STRAF-UND CIVILRECHT (1900);.
MORTON, VERSCHULDUNGSPRINZIP, VERURSACHUNGSPRINZIP (1926).
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and have often been regarded as in conflict. 1 Tested by the criterion I have
submitted, they were each rightly decided and are not out of accord.
In the Polemis case, 52 a workman employed by defendants dropped a plank
in the hold of the plaintiff's ship and thereby caused an explosion of gasoline
vapor which destroyed the ship. It was found that the workman could not
have anticipated the explosion but should have foreseen other possible injury..
The Court of Appeal held the defendant liable even though the damage could
not have been foreseen.
In the Palsgraf case,53 a man carrying a small package sought to board a car
on a moving suburban train but seemed unsteady as if about to fall. A guard
on the car who had held the door open reached forward to help him in, and
another guard on the platform pushed him from behind. The package was dis-
lodged and fell upon the rails. It contained fireworks which exploded, and the
shock of the explosion threw down some scales at the other end of the platform
many feet away; the plaintiff was struck'by a flying weight and injured. The
package was covered by a newspaper and there was nothing about it to in-
dicate that it contained anything more than some ordinary small purchase.
There was judgment for the plaintiff in the trial court which was affirmed by
the Appellate Division but reversed in the Court of Appeals by a divided court,
three of the seven judges who sat dissenting. The opinion of the majority was
written by Chief Judge Cardozo, afterward one of the Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States. The dissenting opinion was written by Judge
Andrews.
These two cases are entirely reconcilable by the test I have proposed, and
each is right in result, whatever differences may appear in the reasoning of the
judges about causation. To drop a heavy plank into the hold of a big ship-
valued at about one million dollars-is in itself a grave threat to the general
security. Almost anything or any person might be struck with serious results.
There was no question of balance of the social interest in the individual life
with the social interest in the general security. The employee was doing his
employer's work. He was not doing anything which he should have been
especially protected in doing or encouraged in doing. On the other hand, in
helping the passenger get on the car, the guards were doing nothing that
threatened the general security; nor was there any serious threat to the gen-
eral security in the way they did it. If there was danger that the package
would be dropped, that in itself threatened no more than loss of a small parcel
of merchandise. The guards were doing what common humanity and their
duty toward their employer impelled them to do, and the social interest in the
individual life--in their individual freedom of action-should be weighed
against any threat to the general security, which with respect to the plaintiff
was very slight. The intuitions of courts derived from experience are some-
times better than their reasoning.
51. GOODHART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW 120-50 (1931).
52. In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.).
53. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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CAUSATION AND 'CONCURRENT NEGLIGENCE
What I have argued is borne out by the cases of concurrent negligence, a
subject long embarrassed by the supposed necessity of finding the one culpable
actor, the rule against contribution among tortfeasors threatening to throw the
whole loss unfairly upon one of a number of wrongdoers and the doctrine of
insulation by the independent act of another as a means of mitigation.
Four recent cases will suffice to make the point. Carpini v. Pittsburgh &
Wierton Bus Co.54 was an action by injured passengers against the Bus Com-
pany and General Motors, maker of a bus operated by the Bus Company. The
bus, which had a seating capacity of thirty-eight, was carrying fifty-nine pas-
sengers and had given trouble with its brakes on an earlier trip. It was driven
negligently down a steep hill on a road covered with rocks and debris after a
severe storm. The makers of the bus were found negligent in the design of the
bus in that the petcocks to drain the air chambers were left unprotected and
so low to the ground as to be likely to be broken by such things as a stone on
the highway and so let the air escape and cause the braking system to fail.
After the accident, it was found that a petcock on the bus was broken off.
While the bus was going down the hill, the braking power failed, the driver
lost control and the bus crashed into a wall and was wrecked. Eleven persons
were killed and forty-nine were injured. The main controversy was between
the two defendants. Each claimed that the other was responsible. There was
a verdict against both and judgment against both was affirmed.
In Langston v. Moseleyr' the first defendant, having driven part way across
an intersection, saw that the red light signal was against him, stopped and
backed, and in so doing drove against and under the bumper of the second
defendant, locking the bumpers. While the two were endeavoring to disengage
the cars, they called on the plaintiff to help them and one told the plaintiff to
get up on the bumpers to shake them, assuring him that there was no danger,
but, as the jury found, doing nothing to warn him of the coming of other cars.
While this was going on, the third defendant, driving on the wrong side of the
street, hit the first defendant's car, and the impact knocked the plaintiff to the
pavement injuring him. The jury found for the plaintiff, there was judgment
against all three defendants, and the first defendant appealed. The judgment
was affirmed.
In Noel v. Menninger Foundation,50 plaintiff, a mental patient in a hospital,
was permitted by an attendant to go upon a heavily traveled highway, con-
tinually used by fast-moving traffic, when his mental condition was such that
he was unable to understand the danger. He was struck and seriously injured
by a truck negligently driven by the driver of a co-defendant. The trial court
sustained a demurrer. The Supreme Court reversed a judgment in favor of
the hospital and remanded the case with instructions to overrule the demurrer.
54. 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954).
55. 223 Ark. 250, 265 S.W.2d 697 (1954).
56. 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954).
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Yandell v. National Fireproofing Corp.5 7 was an action by an employee of
the consignee against the consignor, the initial carrier, intermediate carriers,
the delivering carrier and an employee of the delivering carrier for injuries in-
curred while unloading the contents of a defective and negligently loaded box-
car. Judgment for the plaintiff upon overruling of demurrers by the several
defendants was affirmed.
In Carpini we find a clear and emphatic statement by a strong court against
the fallacious proposition that injuries in such cases are to be attributed ex-
clusively to the last actor as the "proximate" cause. Here, General Motors
negligently set the stage which subjected the plaintiff, as one of those who
might reasonably be expected to ride in the bus, to an unreasonable risk of
injury. The Bus Company, acting negligently on the set stage, subjected the
passengers to a serious risk of injury by sending out a bus the brakes of which
had been acting badly, grossly overloading it and driving it down a steep hill
at a high speed. The injury was caused by risks operating concurrently to
which the plaintiff was unreasonably subjected by each defendant independent-
ly. Concurrent negligence is negligence of two or more persons concurring, not
necessarily in point of time, but in point of consequence in producing a single
indivisible injury. In this case, the threat to the general security in the risk
created by each defendant was very serious, as shown by the great number
of persons killed and injured.
Langston has to do with three of the ideas I have been discussing. The
majority of the court held that a person responsible for only one of several
causes combining to produce injury is liable if, without his negligent act or
conduct, injury would not have happened. It is the "but for" rule suggested
by Judge Jeremiah Smith. The dissenting opinion asserts that the majority
goes on an erroneous proposition that the negligence of the first and of the
third defendants were both concurrent and efficient. That is, the negligence
of the third defendant was "the last proximate cause," and the injury is to be
imputed to that. This is the "insulation" or breaking the chain of causation
theory which is disappearing from the books and has no foundation in the pur-
pose of the legal order. In this case, the first and second defendants negligently
set the stage subjecting the plaintiff and others who might come along upon
the highway to a grave, unreasonable risk of injury. The third defendant, act-
ing negligently on the set stage and by driving on the wrong side of the road
making a serious threat to the general security, did plaintiff the injury to risk
of which the first and second defendants had unreasonably subjected him. The
case was so decided as to accord with the sound rule. There can be concurrent
tortfeasors even if they are not acting jointly. One injury here was caused by
grave risks to which the plaintiff was subjected independently and unreason-
ably by each defendant.
In Noel the hospital-hospitals have no immunity in Kansas-negligently
set a perilous stage, and the co-defendants came along and acted on it negli-
57. 239 N.C. 1, 79 S.E.2d 223 (1953).
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gently. Formerly, it would have been said that the negligence of the driver
of the truck was the proximate cause of the resulting accident. But here, while
each defendant independently subjected the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk
of injury, the plaintiff was at the same time injured in one event while in the
ambit of each risk. Allowing the demented plaintiff to be unattended on a busy
highway where motor traffic was passing and repassing continuously was a
grave threat to the general security. Driving a truck carelessly on such high-
way was a threat no less grave. As the plaintiff's injury was in the ambit of
each risk when it occurred, there was concurring negligence.
In Yandell each of the defendants held liable imposed an unreasonable risk
upon every one, who, as many were bound to, had occasion to come in contact
with the negligently loaded, uninspected, defective boxcar. There was a grave
threat to the general security along the whole line. The plaintiff was injured
in the ambit of the risk created by the concurring negligence which resulted in
producing the one injury.
To revert to an observation of Judge Smith,58 putting on the market motor
buses with braking apparatus liable to fail, careless driving of an overloaded
passenger bus, careless driving of motor vehicles on much traveled highways,
failure to attend demented patients and allowing them to go at large upon
crowded thoroughfares, putting defective cars on trains going on long journeys
through many states, carelessly loading them, and leaving them uninspected to
endanger many workers on their journey to their destination, make such
threats to the general security under the conditions of life today that courts are
giving up the quest of determining how and when to exempt tortfeasors from
liability for effects which were really caused by their torts.
One might add that the recent decisions as to concurring negligence fit well
with the prevailing doctrine of spreading the loss. It may be spread by con-
tribution among those whose negligence concurred in causing the injury.
Instead of the figurative expression insulation of a defendant's negligence,
the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Torts 59 speaks of a
superseding negligence. The negligence of the defendant is said to be super-
seded by the supervening negligence of a third party when his act or conduct
is not "extraordinarily negligent." This is the sound criterion if by "extraor-
dinary" we mean a more than ordinary threat to the general security in the
risk created. Should there be a different rule, however, if the resulting injury
was not to a third person but to the supervening actor? Such a situation is
suggested by a recent case in Pennsylvania. 60 If negligence of a plaintiff con-
tributing in any degree to the result is an absolute bar, perhaps there must.
However, what is called the plaintiff's husband's supervening negligence in
the Pennsylvania case seems from the facts set forth in the opinion of the court
to have been rather inability to deal adequately under the circumstances with
58. Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HAav. L. REv. 103 (1911).
59. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 447 (1934).
60. Listino v. Union Paving Co., 386 Pa. 32, 124 A.2d 83 (1956).
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a difficult situation caused by the very serious risk and threat to the general
security created by the defendant. Had the husband been permitted to sue,
the case would be one for comparative negligence wherever that just substitute
for the absolute bar of contributory negligence obtains.
Finally, have we not in this story of theories of causation in the law of torts
a significant point in the perennial controversy as to codification? If the Anglo-
American law of torts had been codified one hundred years ago, liability would
have been tied to the idea of fault and the analogy of aggression. If it had been
codified at the beginning of the present century, liability would have been tied
to the idea of proximate cause. The advent of motor vehicles, air transporta-
tion, high voltage power wires and electric apparatus in the home have given
experience of multiplied risks which threaten the general security and to which
those ideas are inadequate. An uncodified law able to develop experience by
reason and test reason by experience is proving to make our law of torts equal
to its tasks by working out principles-starting points for reasoning-in the
orderly course of judicial decision.
